The Antitrust and Intellectual Property Intersection in European Union Law by Petit, Nicolas
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2796670 
THE ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 







In European legal scholarship, many articles discuss the equilibrium 
reached in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) when the EU antitrust prohibitions apply to, and restrain, the 
free and ordinary use of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”).1  We call 
this the antitrust-IP intersection.   
The most interesting feature of this literature is perhaps the common 
assumption that a unifying substantive perspective, vision or theory on 
IPR underpins the intersection point reached by the antitrust case-law.  
Whilst the theory of “absolutism” can be quickly disposed of – it treats 
IPRs as statutory-crafted islands of monopoly in a sea of competition and 
grants IPR owners absolute freedom to exploit their rights without any risk 
of antitrust liability –2 several other theories are often advanced to 
rationalize the antitrust-IP intersection.  The “theory of inherency” is one 
of them.  Drexl explains that the theory of inherency “allow[s] 
competition-law application only if the right is used to restrain competition 
outside the scope of the exclusive right”.3  Dreyfus and Liannos write that it 
“protects the practices inherent to the exercise of the IP right from the 
                                         
*
 Professor of Law, University of Liege, Belgium. Director of the Liege Competition 
and Innovation Institute (LCII), www.lcii.eu. I am grateful to D. Auer and J. Marcos 
Ramos for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.   
1
 This research is the by-product of the CJEU judgments, which often use abstract 
concepts and do not clearly articulate the elements of this supposed theory. Its judgments 
distillate an “it-is-so-because-we-says-so” approach, in the words of Antonin Scalia. See 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989). A related doctrine is the 
limited license theory, whereby the fact that an IPR owner has granted a license on 
restrictive terms cannot give rise to antitrust liability, for the simple reason that the IPR 
owner could have instead decided not to provide a license. 
2 Käseberg, T. (2012), Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in 
the EU and the US, Hart Studies in Competition Law, Hart Publishing at pp.25-26.  The 
source of the island metaphor is impossible to trace, and is practically unhelpful.  See 
Gosh, S. (2009). Carte Blanche, Quanta and Competition Policy, 34 Iowa J. CORP. L. 
1209. 
3
 We take this formulation from Drexl, J. (Ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 
Munich, Germany, 2008, at p. 36. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2796670 
23-Jun-16]  EUROPEAN ANTITRUST-IP INTERSECTION 2 
application of competition law”.4  
An alternative theory that some scholars and practitioners extract from 
the case-law is the “theory of exceptionalism” which says that antitrust 
liability for IPR related conduct can only be found in “exceptional 
circumstances”.5 The substantive foundations of exceptionalism are 
unclear, and can be traced to natural rights, utilitarianism or 
consequentialism.6 At a more pedestrian level, exceptionalism entails to 
set the rules of engagement of antitrust liability at a level that is, at least 
on paper, higher in IPR cases than in non IPR cases. 
Lastly, the “theory of complementarity”7 views antitrust rules and IP 
protection as a complementary set of market institutions which converge 
towards a common goal.8 This view has become “mainstream” in recent 
years,9 and seems to be the one favored by policy makers.10  Its main 
implication is that ex post antitrust enforcement is never perceived as 
illegitimate when it seeks to correct certain ex ante defects of the IP 
                                         
4
 Lianos, I. & Dreyfuss, R.C. (2013). New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual 
Property Rights with Competition Law – A view from Europe and the United States. CLES 
Working Paper Series 4/2013.  
5
 Ahlborn, C., Evans, D. S. & Padilla, A. J. (2004). The Logic & Limits of the 
‘Exceptional Circumstances Test’ in Magill and IMS Health. Fordham International Law 
Journal, 28(4): 1108-1156; Heim, M. (2015). Observations on the Evolving Relationship 
between European Competition Policy and Patent Law. AIPLA 2015 Annual Meeting, 
Washington DC; Vesterdorf, B. (2013). IP Rights and Competition Law Enforcement 
Questions. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 4(2), 109-111.  
6
 Epstein, R.A. (2016). The Constitutional Foundations of Intellectual Property: A 
Natural Rights Perspective (Book Review). Federalist Society Review, Vol. 17, Issue 1. 
7
 The expression is used by Kolstad, O. (2008). Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights – Outline of an Economics-based Approach in Drexl, J. (2008) op. cit., 
supra note 3. He notes though that the two disciplines are not fully complementary, 
because despite their joint aim of dynamic efficiency (i) competition law primarily seeks to 
protect static efficiency and (ii) IP law (unlike competition law) also protects non-
economic goals.  
8
 Anderman, S. D. (Ed.). (2007). The interface between intellectual property rights and 
competition policy. Cambridge University Press. Cohler, C. B., & Pearson, H. E. (1994). 
Software Interfaces, Intellectual Property and Competition Policy. European Intellectual 
Property Review, 16, 434. Cohler & Pearson note that “both policies protect a free market 
economy”. See also Kolstad (2008) op. cit., note 6, “It can be argued that competition law 
and IP law share the same objectives”. 
9
 Czapracka, K. A. (2009). Intellectual Property and the Limits of Antitrust – A 
Comparative Study of US and EU Approaches, Edward Elgar;   Czapracka, K. A. (2007). 
Where antitrust ends and IP begins-On the roots of the Transatlantic clashes. Yale Journal 
of Law & Technology, 9, 44. 
10
 Peeperkorn, L. and Paulis, E. (2005). Competition and Innovation: Two Horses 
Pulling the Same Cart in Lugard, P. and Hancher, L. (eds) (2005), On the Merits: 
Current Issues in Competition Law and Policy: Liber Amicorum Peter Plompen, 
Intersentia. 
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system,11 and in particular when it attacks “improvidently defined IPRs”.12     
Against this backdrop, this paper is one of a legal realist. It submits 
that the antitrust-IP intersection does not rest on any unitary theory which, 
in turn, bespeaks the Court’s vision of the social function of IPRs.13 
Instead, the main feature of the CJEU case-law is that a specific 
methodology is applied to antitrust cases with IPR ramifications. The 
CJEU deals with most of such cases under a rule-based approach, as 
opposed to a standard-based approach.14 By rule-based approach, we refer 
to the ex ante setting of structured tests of liability or justifiability, by 
opposition to ex post case-by-case resolution on grounds of a pre-
determined, general standard (e.g., reasonableness, competition on the 
merits, efficiency, fairness, equity, etc.).  
As will be seen below, this approach has many virtues, not least in 
terms of legal certainty. But it also has a major qualification.  Whilst the 
Court has consistently formulated rules of liability and justifiability at the 
antitrust and IP intersection, it has at the same time often embedded 
abstract standards within those rules.  The implications of this mixed 
approach are unclear.   
To address those issues, this paper proceeds by elimination. We first 
show that the theory of inherency has not played a major role in the CJEU 
antitrust case-law (I). We then move on to track the prominence gained by 
the theory of exceptionalism in modern case-law. We demonstrate that it is 
a vacuous concept, devoid of substantive density (II). We turn then to the 
mainstream theory of complementarity, and find somewhat surprisingly 
that the EU Courts make little reference to it in their case law (III). We 
then pause for a short while to examine less influential theories which 
were rejected by the CJEU (IV). This brings us to our last section, which 
claims that the main systemic feature of the CJEU antitrust case-law in 
                                         
11
 Ullrich H.,  Propriété intellectuelle, concurrence et régulation – limites de protection 
et limites de contrôle, Revue internationale de droit économique 2009/4 (t. XXIII, 4) ; 
Govaere I. & Ullrich H. (eds.). (2008). Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public 
Interest. Peter Lang, Brussels, 315 pp. College of Europe Studies. Vol. 8.  
12
  Czapracka (2009), supra note 9. 
13
 Temple Lang makes a similar claim. He argues that “[t]he law has developed 
piecemeal without any explicit framework or general principle, and the Court has never 
explained the principles comprehensively”.  See, Lang, J. T. (2010, November). European 
competition law and intellectual property rights—a new analysis. ERA Forum (Vol. 11, 
No. 3, pp. 411-437). Springer-Verlag. 
14
 For the difference between rules and standards, see Kaplow, L. (1992). Rules versus 
standards: An economic analysis. Duke Law Journal, 557-629.  For a discussion in the 
antitrust field, see Posner, R. (2001). Antitrust Law, 2nd. Ed. The University of Chicago 
Press, at p.39.  
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IPR cases may not be substantive, but methodological. In a significant 
proportion of the IP-related antitrust cases issued to date, the Court has 
almost invariably resorted to a rule-based approach, instead of a standard-
based approach (V). 
 
I.  INHERENCY 
 
The theory of inherency is an unconvincing rationalization of the 
antitrust-IP intersection. The point here is not that it does not exist in EU 
law. It does. Instead, it is that this theory has not exerted much influence 
in the review of antitrust allegations (as compared to other allegations of 
EU law infringements).  
This can be seen in the treatment of inherency concept in early 
antitrust case-law. Whilst the EU Courts have introduced inherency-
colored concepts like the “existence v exercise” dichotomy or “specific 
subject matter” and “essential function” of IPRs (A), those concepts have 
mostly served rhetorical purposes in relation to antitrust allegations (B). 
Moreover, the irrelevance of those concepts has been precipitated in the 
modern era, with the EU Courts progressively phasing out any reference 
to them in its case-law (C).15 
 
A.  Emergence of Inherency Concepts in Formative Case-Law 
 
A noteworthy feature of the early antitrust case-law of the EU Courts 
lies in the introduction of a number of inherency-related concepts which 
all seem to accept the existence of IPRs, and to limit antitrust intervention 
to certain residual acts of IPR owners which go beyond what is deemed to 
be reasonable.   
The existence v exercise dichotomy is one of them.  In Consten and 
Grundig v Commission – the first antitrust infringement case ever decided 
by the Commission – the Court was invited to pass judgment on the 
antitrust-IP intersection.16 Grundig, a manufacturer of radio receivers, 
recorders, dictaphones and television sets, had granted exclusive territorial 
protection to Consten for the distribution of its products in France.17  In 
                                         
15 It is uneasy to provide a date for the beginning of what we call the modern era in 
EU competition law, but a possible starting point is early 2004, following the major 
institutional reform triggered by the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. 
16
  Ebb, L. F. (1967). The Grundig-Consten Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization of 
National Law and Treaty Law in the Common Market. University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 115(6), 855-889. 
17
 CJEU, Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-
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addition, Grundig as the owner of an international trademark, had 
authorized Consten to register in France the trademark GINT (for Grundig 
International), so that Consten could block parallel imports of GINT 
labelled products coming from other countries.  The Commission affirmed 
liability under Article 101 TFEU finding that the agreement between 
Grundig and Consten that authorized the later to register the GINT 
trademark under its own name was unlawful.18 
On appeal, the Court confirmed in full the Commission’s finding of 
infringement.  On this occasion, it made a number of seminal substantive 
pronouncements which remain good law today. What may be less 
appreciated, however, is the CJEU dictum that the decision of the 
Commission could be deemed lawful because it did “not affect the grant of 
those rights but only limits their exercise to the extent necessary to give 
effect to the prohibition under Article 85 (1) [now Article 101(1) 
TFEU]”.19  With this, the Court inaugurated the idea that competition law 
must operate on the basis of the inherently legitimate existence of IPRs. 
This initial case paved the way to the development of an important 
stream of judgments where the Court invariably held that the “existence” 
of IPRs could not be affected by the prohibitions contained in Article 101 
and 102 TFEU.  Only the “exercise” of IPRs could, in contrast, come 
within the ambit of the antitrust rules.  In what will later become a 
leitmotiv in the case-law, the Court repeated the existence v exercise 
dichotomy in relation to almost all forms IPRs, including patents (Parke 
Davis),20 copyrights (Deutsche Grammophon),21 designs (Keurkoop v 
Nancy Kean Gifts),22 etc.   
                                                                                                       
Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41. 
18
 The Court found this agreement unlawful because it reinforced the exclusive 
territorial protection afforded to the retailer. A similar finding will be made in CJEU, 
28/77, Tepea v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1978:133, §44, where it will note that “the skillful 
use of trademark law has [...] strengthened the territorial protection given by the exclusive 
distribution agreement […]”. 
19
 Id.: “[The] Articles [...] of the Treaty relied upon by the applicants do not exclude 
any influence whatever of Community law on the exercise of national industrial property 
rights”; and the contested decision “does not affect the grant of those rights but only limits 
their exercise to the extent necessary to give effect to the prohibition under Article 85 (1) 
[now Article 101(1) TFEU]”. 
20
 CJEU, 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm and 
Centrafarm, ECLI:EU:C:1968:11, p.72: “the existence of the rights granted by a Member 
State to the holder of a patent is not affected by the prohibitions contained in Articles 85(1) 
and 86 of the Treaty.” 
21
 CJEU, 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte 
GmbH & Co. KG, ECLI:EU:C:1971:59, §§6-7. 
22
 CJEU, 144/81, Keurkoop v Nancy Keane Gifts, ECLI:EU:C:1982:289, §27: 
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In other cases, the Court’s carried the inherency language even 
further.  In Parke Davis, the Court said that not any use of IPRs is 
potentially anticompetitive, but that it had to “degenerate” into an 
infringement.  In Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm, it held that the 
exercise of trademarks was not unlawful in itself, unless the IPR was used 
as “an instrument for the abuse” of a dominant position.23 
In parallel to the existence v exercise dichotomy, the CJEU further 
introduced other inherency-colored concepts in the antitrust case-law, like 
the concepts of “specific-subject matter” and of “essential functions” of 
IPRs.  Enchelmaier defines them as follows: “while the specific subject 
matter tells us what owners of IPRs are allowed to do based on these 
rights, the essential function tells us the economic or other policy reasons 
why the legal system allows them to do so”.24   
Windsurfing is one of those cases.  Here, the Commission had declared 
contrary to Article 101 TFEU several clauses of licensing agreements 
between Windsurfing who owned patents over some parts of sailboards, 
and sailboards manufacturers.  The impugned agreements included a 
clause requiring prior approval by Windsurfing of the boards used by 
licensees as well as a non-challenge clause.  In relation to both clauses, the 
Court noted that they did not fall within the “specific subject matter of the 
patent”, and therefore confirmed that they constituted unlawful restrictions 
of competition.25  
 
                                                                                                       
“Although a right to a design, as a legal entity, does not as such fall within the class of 
agreements or concerted practices envisaged by Article 85 (1), the exercise of that right 
may be subject to the prohibitions contained in the Treaty when it is the purpose, the means 
or the result of an agreement, decision or concerted practice.” 
23
 CJEU, 102/771, Hoffmann-La Roche v Centrafarm, ECLI:EU:C:1978:108, §16.   
24
 Enchelmaier, S. (2010). Intellectual Property, the Internal Market and Competition 
Law in Drexl J. (ed.). Research handbook on Intellectual property and Competition law. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, at p.411. Helen Norman provides also a definition: “each 
form of intellectual property has a ‘specific subject matter’ and an ‘essential function’. In 
relation to patents, the ‘essential function’ is to reward creativity, whilst the ‘specific 
subject matter’ is to allow the proprietor the exclusive right to use the invention to make 
industrial products”. See Norman, H. (2011). Intellectual Property Law Directions. Oxford 
University Press, at p.412.  
25
 CJEU, Case 193/83, Windsurfing International v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1986:75, 
§45 in relation to quality controls and §92 in relation to the non challenge cause: “clearly 
does not fall within the specific subject-matter of the patent, which cannot be interpreted as 
also affording protection against actions brought in order to challenge the patent's 
validity, in view of the fact that it is in the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to 
economic activity which may arise where a patent was granted in error.” 
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B.  Operational Irrelevance of Inherency Concepts in Formative Case-Law 
 
One claim that is often encountered is that the abovementioned 
inherency concepts have played (and still play) a role in the antitrust case 
law of the CJEU.  For instance, Korah has written that “the [CJEU] looks 
to the specific subject matter of the particular kind of IPR when applying 
not only the rules for free movement, but also the competition rules”. 26  
This position cannot be sustained.27 If they really had operational 
relevance, the protective inherency concepts should have resulted in 
exoneration of antitrust liability in a significant number of cases.  On the 
contrary, in most of the cases where the Court had to decide on the merits 
of the competition allegations, it affirmed liability. 
The literature also occasionally obscures the point that the case-law on 
“specific-subject matter” and “essential function” is not, in reality, 
competition case-law.  Whilst it is true that the cases in discussion certainly 
involved allegations of competition law infringements, those allegations 
were systematically preceded by allegations of violations of the free trade 
provisions of the EU Treaties.  And it is during the review of those 
allegations that the Court employed the inherency concepts, arguably to 
soothe Member States concerns over the division of competence between 
the EU and its Member States.28  
Lastly, in the rare cases where the inherency concepts were put to 
practice, they proved very poor at guiding the antitrust inquiry, and in 
particular at discriminating between antitrust-reprehensible and antitrust-
immune conduct.  This can be seen by comparing two cases, ie Sirena and 
EMI v CBS.  In Sirena, a US producer of cosmetic and medicinal cream had 
assigned trademark rights to distinct manufacturers in Germany and Italy.29  
                                         
26
 See Korah, V. (2006) Intellectual Property Rights and the EC Competition Rules, 
Hart Publishing, at p. 125:  “the ECJ looks to the specific subject matter of the particular 
kind of IPR when applying not only the rules for free movement, but also the competition 
rules” 
27 Korah, herself, has seemed to doubt it. In a 2001 paper, she wrote that the 
existence and exercise dichotomy was a “metaphysical distinction”.  Korah, V. (2001). 
The Interface between Intellectual Property and Antitrust: The European Experience. 
Antitrust Law Journal, 2001, Vol. 69, 801, at p.805. 
28
 See Lianos & Dreyfuss (2013) supra note 4. 
29
 CJEU, 40/70, Sirena v EDA, ECLI:EU:C:1971:18, §9. “A trade-mark right, as a 
legal entity, does not in itself possess those elements of contract or concerted practice 
referred to in Article 85 (1). Nevertheless, the exercise of that right might fall within the 
ambit of the prohibitions contained in the Treaty each time it manifests itself as the subject, 
the means or the result of a restrictive practice. When a trade-mark right is exercised by 
virtue of assignments to users in one or more Member States, it is thus necessary to 
establish in each case whether such use leads to a situation falling under the prohibitions 
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The Italian manufacturer had sought to rely on the trademark to restrict 
imports of the German-made cream on domestic territory.  The CJEU held 
that Article 101 TFEU was applicable to the extent to which “trademarks 
were invoked so as to prevent imports of products” across distinct Member 
States.30  Several years later, the Court reversed this case-law in EMI v 
CBS,31 insisting on the proof of an additional agreement or concerted 
practice for a finding of Article 101 TFEU liability, and stressing that the 
“mere exercise of the national trade mark rights” could not be akin to an 
infringement.32   
With this background, the rationalization of the early case-law on the 
antitrust-IP intersection as inherency spirited resembles to a legal fable.33  
The inherency concepts appear mostly to have been used as prose 
introduced in judgements to dispel concerns of antitrust activism in IPR-
related matters.34  Instead, the formative era pictures the Court stepping 
over the very existence of IPRs in several cases.  In Windsurfing 
International for instance, the Court held that “although the Commission is 
not competent to determine the scope of a patent, it is still the case that it 
may not refrain from all action when the scope of the patent is relevant for 
the purposes of determining whether there has been an infringement of 
[101] and [102 TFEU]”.35  And in Sirena, the Court daringly affirmed that 
the public interest protected by trademarks is lower than that protected by 
other IPRs.36 
 
C.  Phasing Out of Inherency Concepts in Modern Case-Law 
 
Dreyfus and Liannos argue that since the Court’s 1982 decision in 
Coditel II, the existence v exercise dichotomy has never featured as an 
                                                                                                       
of Article 85”. 
30
 Id., § 11. 
31
 CJEU, 86/75, EMI Records Limited v. CBS Grammofon A/S, ECLI:EU:C:1976:86. 
32
 Id., §§24-29. 
33
  See Lianos & Dreyfuss (2013) supra note 4. 
34
 As Korah rightly notes in relation to the exercise v existence dichotomy, those 
concepts are elusive: “the existence of a right comprises all the ways in which it may be 
exercised”. See Korah (2006) supra note 26, at p. 3. 
35
 CJEU 193/83, Windsurfing International v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1986:75, §26. 
36
 CJEU, 40/70, Sirena v EDA (cit. note 27). In the case, AG Dutheillet de Lamothe 
had advised the Court that trademarks did not merit special respect because they are 
“nothing more than an aid to advertising”. (C-40/70, Sirena v Eda, ECLI:EU:C:1971:3, 
p.87). At §7 the Court will follow this reasoning, though less explicitly, noting: “Moreover, 
a trade-mark right is distinguishable in this context from other rights of industrial and 
commercial property, inasmuch as the interests protected by the latter are usually more 
important, and merit a higher degree of protection, than the interests protected by an 
ordinary trade-mark”.  
23-Jun-16]  EUROPEAN ANTITRUST-IP INTERSECTION 9 
important element of the Court’s reasoning in competition cases involving 
IP rights.37  This finding is not entirely right, at least time wise.  In 1988 
the Court held in AB Volvo and Erik Veng that a car manufacturer could 
lawfully refuse to grant licenses of its design rights on car parts, even in 
exchange for a reasonable royalty.  In turn, the Court hammered again to 
that the “exercise” of this exclusive right could be prohibited by Article 
102 TFEU, if it involves “certain abusive conduct”.   
That said, Dreyfus and Liannos’ point is certainly valid in relation to 
the other inherency concepts.38 The seminal Magill case of 1995 best 
evidences this.  At issue was the conduct of British and Irish TV channels, 
who had relied in parallel on their respective copyrights over weekly 
schedules to prevent a third party from editing a novel, comprehensive TV 
magazine covering all channels’ programmes. The Commission found an 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU.  On appeal, the General Court upheld 
the Commission’s reasoning, relying heavily on the inherency notion of 
“essential function”.  It held in particular that the channels conduct went 
“beyond what it necessary to fulfil the essential function of the copyright 
as permitted in Community law”.39 
The judgment was further appealed before the CJEU. During the 
proceedings, Advocate General Gulmann used the inherency concepts to 
advise the Court to vacate the appeal.  He noted that “the right to refuse 
licences forms part of the specific subject matter of copyright”.40 And he 
further lambasted the General Court for its failure to extend antitrust 
                                         
37 
 Lianos and Dreyfuss (2013) supra note 4, at p.55. In Coditel II, the Court affirmed 
“Although copyright in a film and the right deriving from it, namely that of exhibiting the 
film, are not, therefore, as such subject to the prohibition contained in Article 85, the 
exercise of those rights may, none the less, come within the said prohibitions where there 
are economic or legal circumstances the effect of which is to restrict film distribution to an 
appreciable degree or to distort competition on the cinematographic market”. See CJEU, 
C-262/81, Coditel v Ciné-Vog Films, ECLI:EU:C:1982:334, §17. 
38
 Already in the Windsurfing judgment of 1983, the Court made no reference to the 
existence v exercise dichotomy to hold that a patent holder has unlawfully introduced 
restrictive clauses in its licensing agreements with sailboards manufacturers. As seen 
above, the Court relied more predominantly on the concept of “specific subject matter”, 
though to support a finding of liability. CJEU, 193/83, Windsurfing International Inc. v 
Commission (cit. note 33). 
39
 GC, T-69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1991:39, §73: 
“goes beyond what it necessary to fulfil the essential function of the copyright as permitted 
in Community law”. 
40
 Opinion of Advocate General Gulmann in Joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, 
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1994:210, §§38 and 70. 
23-Jun-16]  EUROPEAN ANTITRUST-IP INTERSECTION 10 
immunity to conduct falling within the scope of the “essential function of 
copyright”.41 
In its final determination, the CJEU took a different tack, and refused 
to review the case through the “specific subject matter” and/or “essential 
function” of copyrights.42  Instead, the judgment soberly stated that “the 
exercise of an exclusive right by the proprietor may, in exceptional 
circumstances, involve abusive conduct”.43  As Czapracka rightly observes, 
proceeding on the basis of the specific subject matter would have 
restricted the Court’s ability to hold the TV channels liable of an abuse, as 
the TV channels had strictly behaved as ordinary IP owners.44   
In retrospect, Magill signed the death knell of inherency concepts in 
antitrust case-law.  As will be seen in the next section, no judgment of the 
CJEU has since then relied on “specific subject matter” or “essential 
function” as a decisive parameter of antitrust liability. Instead, the Court 
has embraced a novel concept of “exceptional circumstances”, whose 




Several authors consider that the antitrust-IP intersection is governed 
by a theory of “exceptionalism”.  Under this theory, the exercise of IPRs 
is deemed presumptively lawful under the antitrust provisions, save in 
“exceptional circumstances”.  With this, the rules of engagement of 
antitrust liability are allegedly set at a level that is higher than in non-IPR 
cases.  The theory of exceptionalism would have been the one followed by 
the CJEU and the lower courts in most antitrust cases with IP 
ramifications since Magill, though with variations.  In the following 
sections, we track the evolution of this theory since Magill (A), and 
discuss whether it is indeed the theory that today governs the antitrust-IP 
intersection (B).  We conclude with a discussion on the scholarly 
interpretation of the meaning of exceptionalism (C). 
 
                                         
41
 This paragraph draws from the analyzis found in Lianos and Dreyfuss (2013) 
excellent paper, supra note 4, at p.55. 
42
  Id. 
43
 CJEU, C-241/91 and C-242/91, RTE and ITP Ltd v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:98.  This point is also stressed in Lianos and Dreyfuss (2013) supra note 
4, p.55. 
44
 Czapracka (2007) supra note 9. This was actually the approach encouraged by 
Advocate General Gulmann, who had advised the Court to reject antitrust liability, on the 
ground that the TV channels had stayed with the specific subject matter of their right.  This 
may explain that the Court strayed from the early restrictive concepts. 
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A.  Cases 
 
The novel concept of “exceptional circumstances” introduced in Magill 
was not immediately picked upon by the lower courts, and a period of 
fluctuation appeared at the General Court level.  In the 1997 Tiercé 
Ladbroke SA v Commission judgment, the GC refused to discuss the 
existence of “exceptional circumstances”, despite the fact that the dispute 
concerned very similar allegations, namely that a French horse trading 
company had refused to license its copyrights over televised pictures and 
sound commentaries of French races to Ladbroke, whose business consisted 
in operating horse betting outlets in Belgium.45  The Court confirmed the 
Commission’s decision to reject Labroke’s complaint, and noted that Magill 
was highly specific, and limited to scenarios of anticompetitive leveraging 
where the dominant firm also exploits the IPRs, and uses them to harm 
competitors.46  Two years later, the General Court will however endorse 
Magill’s “exceptional circumstances” in Micro Leader Business v 
Commission.  The case focused on Microsoft’s attempts to restrict Canadian 
wholesalers from exporting copyrighted computer software towards the EU.  
The GC stressed that Microsoft could lawfully enforce its copyrights in 
Europe in order to prevent imports of products first sold in Canada.47  
However, it added obiter dictum, and quoting Magill, that: “[it is clear from 
the case-law that whilst, as a rule, the enforcement of copyright by its 
holder, as in the case of the prohibition on importing certain products from 
outside the Community in to a Member State of the Community, is not in 
itself a breach of Article 86 [now 102 TFEU] of the Treaty, such 
enforcement may, in exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct 
(emphasis added)”.48  
In the next case to reach the EU Courts docket, the CJEU made clear 
that the concept of “exceptional circumstances” introduced in Magill was 
not a passade.   In IMS Health, a marketing data firm had designed a very 
granular map which could be used by stakeholders of the pharmaceutical 
industry to track sales over the German territory.  The map soon became 
                                         
45
 This point is also made by Czapracka (2007) who notes that Ladbroke is loser than 
IMS Health, supra note 9, at p.85. 
46
 See GC, T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1997:84, §130: 
“The applicant cannot rely on the Magill judgment to demonstrate the existence of the 
alleged abuse, since that decision is not in point”. In reality, “in the absence of direct or 
indirect exploitation by the sociétés de courses of their intellectual property rights on the 
Belgian market, their refusal to supply cannot be regarded as involving any restriction of 
competition on the Belgian market”. 
47
 For this would remain consistent with the principle of European exhaustion. 
48
 See GC, T-198/98, Micro Leader Business v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1999:341, 
§§34 and 56. 
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an industry standard, not least because it had been developed in 
cooperation with the pharmaceutical industry.  When a former employee 
of IMS Health set up a new marketing data company (“NDC”), and 
designed its own competing map, he did not manage to attract clients for 
most prospective users were accustomed to IMS Health maps.   NDC thus 
proceeded to use IMS Health’s type of maps.  A dispute unravelled.  IMS 
Health, which held copyrights over the maps, sought and obtained a 
prohibitory injunction against NDC before the German courts. NDC 
reciprocated by launching antitrust proceedings before the Commission 
alleging that IMS Health was guilty of abusive refusal to supply.  The 
Commission affirmed liability, but the operation of the Commission’s 
decision was suspended on appeal. In parallel, as the initial injunctive 
relief case moved through the German appeals system, a preliminary 
reference was eventually sent to the CJEU.    
The wording of the judgment leaves no shred of a doubt on the Court’s 
resolve to cement the Magill case-law.  Quoting Magill, the Court held 
generally that “exercise of an exclusive right by the owner may, in 
exceptional circumstances, involve abusive conduct”.49  This statement is 
not specifically cantoned to refusals to license.  In fact, the Court quotes 
as further authority a paragraph of AB Volvo and Erik Veng where it is 
said that pricing levels of IPR protected goods can fall foul of Article 102 
TFEU.  All this notwithstanding, what is perhaps more important in IMS 
Health is however not explicit in the judgment.  In the scholarship, some 
had hewed to the view that Magill was confined to its own facts, and that 
the main driver behind the finding of antitrust liability was to correct an 
anomaly in Irish IP law, namely that ludicrous IPRs could be 
improvidently granted for TV schedules.50 IMS Health proved this reading 
wrong.  Magill was not an anecdotal judgment.  Unlike in Magill, where 
the IPRs in question might have seemed improvidently awarded, the IPRs 
in dispute were ordinary garden variety.51   
Since IMS Health, two sets of cases have seemed to further the theory 
of “exceptionalism”. First, exceptionalism has been the approach 
ordinarily followed in refusal to license cases, not least in the Microsoft I 
and II judgments of the General Court where it was held that Microsoft 
had unlawfully withheld essential interoperability information from rivals, 
                                         
49
 See CJEU, C-418/01 IMS Health, ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, §35. 
50
 Korah, V. (2001) supra note 26 (writing that “In Magill, the intellectual property 
rights were wider than are usually granted in Europe or elsewhere”). Czapracka (2009) 
supra note 9, at p.47, in particular footnote 44. 
51
 See CJEU, IMS Health, supra note 49, §22. The Court noted that the case was based 
on the assumption that IMS Health maps are protected by an IPR. 
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in a bid to leverage its dominant position on the market for Operating 
Systems (“OS”) for PCs towards the adjacent market for work group 
servers OS.52  In the two Microsoft cases, the General Court cases recalled 
that such exceptional circumstances were met, even though Microsoft I 
promoted a somewhat controversial interpretation of Magill and IMS 
Health.53 
Second, the theory of exceptionalism has also been applied to IP 
remedy cases.  In Protégé International v Commission,54 Pernod Ricard 
SA, who owned the “Wild Turkey” trademark for whiskey, had 
commenced opposition proceedings with several trademark offices upon 
learning that Protégé International had applied for the registration of the 
“Wild Geese” trademark for whiskey.  Protégé International reciprocated by 
lodging an antitrust complaint with the EU Commission, alleging that the 
initiation of opposition proceedings by Pernod Ricard SA was an 
anticompetitive abuse.  The Commission dismissed the complaint, and the 
General Court affirmed.  It observed that because access to justice is a 
fundamental right, it is only in “wholly exceptional circumstances” that the 
pursuit of legal remedies – including on the basis of IPRs can be deemed 
abusive.  In the GC’s view, such circumstances are present when the 
proceedings cannot be “considered as an attempt to establish its rights and 
can therefore only serve to harass the opposite party”; and (ii) are 
conceived as a “framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate 
competition”.55  
 
B.  Is the Antitrust-IP Intersection Governed by the Theory of 
Exceptionalism? 
 
With this background, the following sections seek to understand if the 
theory of exceptionalism can be deemed to be the lynchpin of the antitrust-
IP intersection in modern competition law.  The evidence is mixed.  We 
expose hereafter validating (1) and invalidating arguments (2).  
                                         
52
 See GC, T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission (Microsoft I), ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, 
§331: “It is only in exceptional circumstances that the exercise of the exclusive right by the 
owner of the intellectual property right may give rise to such an abuse”. GC, T-167/08, 
Microsoft Corp. v Commission (Microsoft II), ECLI:EU:T:2012:323, §§139-140 (though 
the GC does not explicitly mentions exceptional circumstances, it rules that the IMS Health 
conditions were fulfilled in Microsoft I). 
53
 See the discussion below and Fox, E. (2008). Microsoft (EC) and Duty to Deal: 
Exceptionality and the Transatlantic Divide. CPI Journal, 2008, vol. 4.  
54
 See GC, T-119/09, Protégé International Ltd v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2012:421. 
55
 Id., §49. 




The 2012 judgment of the CJEU in AstraZeneca v Commission 
corroborates particularly well the hypothesis that the theory of 
exceptionalism is the lynchpin of the antitrust-IP intersection.56  This 
judgment is often – and understandably – overlooked in the antitrust and IP 
literature because the impugned conduct did not involve an IP-instrumented 
strategy.  This notwithstanding, AstraZeneca v Commission makes 
important dicta on the antitrust-IP intersection.  The AstraZeneca Court had 
to review previous decisions that had held a dominant drug manufacturer 
liable of unlawful abusive tactics aimed at delaying generics competition.  
Amongst other things, the dominant firm had acted before three national 
agencies to obtain deregistration of its marketing authorisations over 
capsules of its blockbuster drug Losec.  In turn, the dominant firm had 
withdrawn all existing Losec capsules from those markets, and launched 
Losec in tablet format.  The Commission found, and the General Court 
confirmed, that those measures sought to prevent rival generic manufacturer 
to rely on the marketing authorization to speedily release Losec capsules.   
In the course of the proceedings, AstraZeneca sought to draw an 
analogy with the IMS Health case, and argued that it is only in “exceptional 
circumstances” that its statutory right to free deregistration could be 
undermined by Article 102 TFEU.57  With this, AstraZeneca hoped to have 
the Court declare that the Commission and the General Court had applied 
an insufficiently stringent liability test.   
The Court dismissed AstraZeneca’s claim, and confirmed the 
Commission and General Court’s findings of unlawful abuse.  However, an 
often-missed point is that the Court’s judgment unequivocally endorsed the 
exceptionalism hypothesis.  The reasoning is convoluted, yet the point is 
clear. The Court first held that antitrust law can bring limitations to the 
exercise of a statutory-granted right to deregistration, and that a finding of 
                                         
56
 See CJEU, C-457/10, AstraZeneca v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2012:770. 
57
 Id., §142: “The appellants maintain that the General Court erred in law in 
considering that the conduct impugned in the context of the second abuse tended to restrict 
competition. They argue that the mere exercise of a right lawfully afforded by Union law 
could at the most amount to an ‘abuse’ only in exceptional circumstances, namely where 
there is an elimination of all effective competition, a mere propensity to distort competition 
not being sufficient for that purpose. An analogy should be drawn with compulsory 
licensing cases, such as that dealt with in Case C-418/01 IMS Health [2004] ECR I-5039. 
That analogy is justified by virtue of the ‘effective expropriation’ of the right to request 
deregistration of the MA and by virtue of the fact that the prohibition on deregistration is a 
form of compulsory licensing”. 
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abuse under such circumstances is in no way an “exceptional case”.58  The 
Court then moved on to add an important statement: the situation in the case 
at hand “does not justify a derogation from Article [102 TFEU], unlike a 
situation in which the unfettered exercise of an exclusive right awarded for 
the realisation of an investment or creation is limited”.59  What this means 
does not deserve long explanation.  The Court mutters that IPRs – it talks 
of “exclusive rights” – are subject to a derogatory regime under Article 
102 TFEU.  Their “unfettered exercise”, says the Court implicitly, can 
only be restricted in “exceptional” cases.  And this is due to the fact that 
they are the reward of an investment of creation, unlike the right to 
deregistration. 
Upon review of the Court’s entire antitrust case-law, we believe that 
no judgment better than AstraZeneca v Commission carries the theory of 
exceptionalism.  The wording of the judgment – which we suppose was 
carefully chosen by the judges – is not circumscribed to refusal to license 
or IP remedies, and talks generally of the “exercise of an exclusive right”.  
In the literature, some scholars consider that exceptionalism is the 
transversal principle behind the antitrust-IP intersection, at least in so far 
as Article 102 TFEU is concerned. Anderman and Schmidt note that 
“Broadly, one can talk of an ‘exceptional circumstances’ test under Article 
[102 TFEU], which operates to limit its application to the exercise of IPRs 
quite explicitly in the case of the abuse of refusal to supply and implicitly 
in the case of the abuse of excessive pricing”.60 Further, they observe that 
“both the language of Article [102 (b) TFEU] and the [EU] judgment in 
IMS offer good grounds for concluding that other types of abuses can also 




At the same time, other contemporary pronouncements of the EU Courts 
seem to discredit the claim that the theory of exceptionalism is the lynchpin 
of antitrust jurisprudence in IPR cases.  We review the various arguments in 
turn.  
 
a. Exceptionalism is not IPR-specific 
The theory of exceptionalism is not an idiosyncrasy of the IPR-related 
antitrust case-law.  On the contrary, the theory of exceptionalism is the one 
                                         
58




 Anderman, S.D and Schmidt, H. (2007). EC competition policy and IPRs, in 
Anderman (2007) supra note 8, at 41. 
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conventionally applied in all refusal to deal cases, regardless of whether the 
asset to which the dominant firm refuses access is IPR-protected or not.  In 
Bronner v Mediaprint, the Court’s seminal case on refusal to deal cases, the 
Court applied the concept of “exceptional circumstances” previously 
affirmed in Magill to a situation where a dominant firm had refused access 
to a pedestrian facility, namely a distribution system for daily newspapers.61   
Similarly, the concept of “wholly exceptional circumstances” found in 
Protégé International v Commission is not a specificity of IPR remedy 
cases.  The General Court had previously applied this strict version of the 
theory of exceptionalism in ITT Promedia, a case where the Belgian 
telecoms incumbent had sought ordinary judicial remedies against a 
publisher of directories that had used its non-IPR-protected subscriber 
data.62   
 
b. Exceptionalism is not systemic in the IPR antitrust law 
If the theory of exceptionalism were the regulating concept of the 
antitrust-IP intersection, then one would expect to observe it in all IPR-
related cases.  However, in the high profile DSD case of 2009, the Grand 
Chamber of the Court dispensed with laboring “exceptional circumstances”.   
In dispute was whether DSD, a dominant German waste collection system, 
had committed an abuse by requiring from its customers the payment of a 
fee for all packaging bearing its trademark, even if those customers had not 
used DSD collecting service.  The Court affirmed antitrust liability, and 
made no single reference to “exceptional circumstances”.63  Instead, the 
Court framed the case as a conventional exploitative abuse case, and 
referenced non-IP precedents in support of its reasoning.   
In addition to this, the theory of exceptionalism has mostly been used in 
abuse of dominance cases, and comparatively little, if not, in 
anticompetitive coordination cases.64  
                                         
61
 CJEU, C-7/97, Bronner v Mediaprint, ECLI:EU:C:1998:569, §26 notably, “[t]hus, 
as the Court expressly held in Magill, an obligation to contract, to which an undertaking 
holding a dominant position would be subject, can be based on Article 86 of the Treaty 
only in exceptional circumstances”. Since Bronner v Mediaprint, all refusal to deal cases 
stress that antitrust liability can only arise in the presence of “exceptional circumstances”. 
62
 See GC, T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1998:183, §60.  
The case was also about the allegedly excessive price charged by Belgacom.   
63
 See CJEU, C-385/07 P, Duales System Deutschland v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:456, §143: “the conduct of [Duales System Deutschland] DSD which is 
objected to in Article 1 of the decision at issue and which consists in requiring payment of 
a fee for all packaging bearing the DGP logo and put into circulation in Germany, even 
where customers of the company show that they do not use the DGP system for some or all 
of that packaging, must be considered to constitute an abuse of a dominant position”.  
64
  Anderman picks up the question in relation to IP licensing: “To what extent does 
competition policy provide special protection in this sphere analogous to the ‘exceptional 
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Surely, this discrepancy may be explained by the dearth of IPR related 
Article 101 TFEU cases in recent years, which in turn originates in a variety 
of reasons.65 Interestingly, the Commission implicitly rebuffed the 
applicability of the theory of exceptionalism under Article 101 TFEU in its 
infringement decision in Lundbeck.66  With patent settlement agreements in 
sight, it held that “[s]uch agreements are fully subject to the discipline of 
competition law”.67  And it added that “this also applies to agreements 
whose purpose is to put an end to or otherwise deal with patent litigation 
or, more broadly, patent disputes”.68  This broad conception remains to be 
scrutinized by the EU courts, but it suggests that the limiting principles of 
the Article 102 TFEU case-law may not apply in the anticompetitive 
coordination space.  
 
c. Exceptionalism and particularism? 
In Huaweï v ZTE, the CJEU introduced a novel possibility to find 
antitrust liability under Article 102 TFEU in the presence of “particular 
circumstances”.69  In the case in point, the legal issue was whether the 
holder of a patent that has been declared essential to a collaborative 
technology standard (“SEPs”), and which it has pledged to license on Fair, 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms, could be deemed 
guilty of unlawful abuse when it applies for a court injunction and/or 
product recall against unlicensed implementers of its technology.   
The Court held that such conduct could be deemed abusive not in 
“exceptional”, but in “particular circumstances”, presumably recognizing 
that the facts before it could not properly be considered as “exceptional” 
given the widespread nature of patent disputes in standardized industries.70  
                                                                                                       
circumstances’ test of Article 82?” without, however, providing an answer. See Steve 
Anderman, (2008). The new EC competition law framework for technology transfer and IP 
licensing’ in Drexl (2008) supra note 3, at p.109. 
65
 Anderman in Drexl (2008) identifies several reasons (see supra note 64). In his 
view, the Nungesser case-law, which treats licensing restrictions as ancillary has laid down 
an IP friendly context for licensing agreements. The case law on exhaustion has limited the 
risk of IP strategies as a market division practice. And the abolition of the notification of 
agreements to the Commission may also have dried up the amount of Article 101 cases to 
reach the Court’s docket.  
66
 The Commission devoted a full section to “patents and competition law”. See 
Commission Decision, Case AT.39226 – Lundbeck, C(2013) 3803 final (19.06.2013), 
§§598 and following. 
67




 CJEU, C-170/13, Huaweï v ZTE, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2391, §48. 
70
 Rato, M., & English, M. (2016). An Assessment of Injunctions, Patents, and 
Standards Following the Court of Justice’s Huawei/ZTE Ruling. Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 7(2): 103-112.  
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Such particular circumstances could be deemed to occur, according to the 
Court, when (i) the patent at issue is “essential … rendering its use 
indispensable to all competitors which envisage manufacturing products 
that comply with the standard […]”; and (ii) the SEP holder has given an 
“irrevocable undertaking […] to the standardisation body in question, that 
it is prepared to grant licences on FRAND terms”.71   
In the scholarship, some practitioners have argued that Huaweï v ZTE 
sets a “different standard” which strays from the theory of exceptionalism.72  
However, the same authors concede that the new concept “resemble[s] the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ of the conventional case law”, so that Huaweï v 
ZTE may be seen as the progeny of Magill and IMS Health.  This 
impression is further supported by the case-law cited by the Court, which 
refers to Volvo, Magill and IMS Health.73 
That said, the right reading is in our view that Huaweï v ZTE sets a 
new rule of engagement of Article 102 TFEU liability that is distinct from 
the theory of exceptionalism.  As the Court explicitly affirms “the 
particular circumstances of the case in the main proceedings distinguish 
that case from the cases which gave rise to the case-law” in Volvo, Magill 
and IMS Health.74  The Court’s reference to the conventional case-law is a 
formal trick.  As is well known, the CJEU hates to explicitly admit that it 
adapts, improves, or reverses conventional case-law. What Huaweï v ZTE 
thus confusingly suggests is that the theory of exceptionalism is not the 
whole and sole threshold for the engagement of antitrust liability against 
IPR strategies.   
 
d. Open-ended content of exceptionalism? 
We believe that there is one last argument which flouts the idea that 
the theory of exceptionalism is the lynchpin of the antitrust-IP intersection.  
The concept of “exceptional circumstances” has been interpreted in the 
case-law to be open-ended, in violation of the general principle of law that 
exceptions ought to be interpreted restrictively.75  As a result, if the theory 
                                         
71
 CJEU, Huaweï v ZTE supra, note 69, §59. 
72
 See Rato & English (2016) supra note 70, at p.107: “In the present ruling, the CJEU 
may have recognised that the facts before the Court did not fit into the established case law 
and that the circumstance could not properly be considered as ‘exceptional’ However, 
rather than concluding that there was therefor no room to find abusive conduct, the CJEU 
adopted a different standard of ‘particular circumstances”. 
73
 Id. §§46-47. 
74
 Id., § 48. 
75
 Dreyfuss and Lianos (2013) supra, note 4, at p.81: “[t]he interpretation of the case 
law and in particular the decisional practice of the Commission and its soft law rule 
making activity indicate, however, that these “exceptional circumstances” have been 
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of exceptionalism exists as a formal legal construct, its scope seems so 
elusive that its substantive value can be called into question. 
Antitrust savvy readers will recall that in IMS Health, the CJEU had 
considered that the presence of three market circumstances was 
“sufficient” to create “exceptional circumstances”, ie that the refusal to 
license (i) prevents the emergence of a new product; (ii) has no objective 
justification; and (iii) eliminates all competition on a secondary market.76  
During the pleadings of the Microsoft case, the Commission took the 
CJEU judgment on the word and argued that the “exceptional 
circumstances” found in IMS Health were not exhaustive. Accordingly, 
proof of the three criterion designated in IMS Health was not a necessary 
requirement. The Commission conceivably understood that the main 
weakness of its case was that it had not established that Microsoft’s 
withholding of interoperability information had prevented the launch of 
new products.  The General Court backed the Commission, contemplating 
the possibility to assess other “particular circumstances” if “one or more 
of those circumstances [identified in Magill and IMS Health] are absent”.77  
This notwithstanding, the GC found that “the circumstance relating to the 
appearance of a new product [was] present in this case”.78 
 
3. Summation 
The above analyzis hints that one should not read too much into the 
concept of “exceptional circumstances”. The theory of exceptionalism 
lacks substance.  Several versions of it co-exist in the case-law.  The 
classic one, elaborated in Magill and IMS Health, applies to refusal to 
license cases.  A stricter version applies in IP remedies cases, like Protégé 
International.  And as an exception to this, an even loser version governs 
IP remedies cases like Huaweï v ZTE. 
Besides, the theory of exceptionalism has not cross-fertilized the 
Article 101 TFEU case-law.79   
                                                                                                       
expanded to cover an array of situations and that the conditions set by the ECJ in 
IMS/NDC Health do not effectively limit the scope of liability under Article 102 TFEU”. 
76
 See CJEU, IMS Health, supra note 49, §38: “in order for the refusal by an 
undertaking which owns a copyright to give access to a product or service indispensable 
for carrying on a particular business to be treated as abusive, it is sufficient that three 
cumulative conditions be satisfied […]”. 
77
 See GC, Microsoft I, supra note 52, §336. 
78
 Id., §665. 
79
 We note here for the sake of exhaustiveness that there is a risk of inconsistency in 
the case-law if it is one day held that exceptionalism does not apply in Article 101 TFEU.  
It is widely admitted that a core social function of IP rights is to enable technology 
dissemination. One thus fails to grasp why “exceptionalism”, which seems predicated on 
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With all this, the theory of exceptionalism seems again to be less of a 
theory than a semantical device, used by the Court to convince readers of 
its judgments (and maybe itself?) that it is not an antitrust activist.  
 
C.  Is Exceptionalism a Pro or Anti-IP doctrine? 
 
In the scholarship, there seems to be a consensus that the theory of 
exceptionalism is protective of IPR owners.80  Within the IPR community, 
Vaver writes that the use of concepts like “exceptions” is skewed towards 
IPR owners, because it treats what “IP owners can do as rights” and 
“what everyone else can do as indulgences, aberrations from some 
preordained norm, activities to be narrowly construed and not 
extended”.81  Similarly, in the competition community, Anderman and 
Schmidt stress that the “exceptional circumstances” test “represents an 
important acceptance by competition law that IPRs are not the same as all 
other forms of property rights” and “corollary proposition that the ‘normal’ 
exercise of IPRs will not abuse a dominant position”.82  Lastly, seasoned 
antitrust economists seem to consider that “exceptional circumstances” 
constitute an optimal legal standard that adequately protects IPR owners 
and socially beneficial investments.83  
                                                                                                       
the idea of observing deference vis a vis IP rights’ social functions, and in particular 
rewards theory, does not equally apply when what is in question is the other social function 
of IP rights, namely technology dissemination.  This unfathomable discrepancy suggests 
the CJEU’s absence of interest for theological considerations in relation to IPRs.  Future 
cases may offer opportunities for the CJEU to elaborate on the issue, given the wide array 
of emerging IP contractual relationships giving rise to litigation in national courts, 
including patent settlements, technology pools and privateering.   
80
 Arezzo remarks however that EU competition law remains stricter strict on IP 
owners than US antitrust law. See Arezzo, E. (2006). Intellectual property rights at the 
crossroad between monopolization and abuse of dominant position: American and 
European approaches compared. John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law. 
24, 455. 
81
 Vaver, D. (2009). Reforming Intellectual Property Law: An Obvious and Not-so-
obvious Agenda. Intellectual Property Quarterly, 2:143-16, at p.159. 
82
 Anderman and Schmidt (2007) supra note 60, at p.107. In the introductory chapter 
to his book, Anderman explains that exceptionalism is a comity principle which seeks to 
govern the external regulation of IP law by competition law. He then notes that the trend in 
EU law is to favour wider IP protection.  See Anderman, S. (2007) The Competition 
Law/IP Interface: An Introductory Note, in Anderman, S. (ed), The Interface between 
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, Cambridge University Press, p.2.  
83
 Ahlborn et al. (2004) supra note 5, at p.1155: “we have shown that this analogous 
approach of high, albeit different, hurdles for compulsory licensing by American and 
European courts constitutes sound competition policy, as it implements the optimal legal 
standard for assessing refusals to license - one that maximizes long run consumer welfare 
by minimizing the expected cost of errors resulting from condemning welfare-increasing 
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This, however, is an illusion.  A quick look at the case-law shows that 
exceptionalism has entitled the Commission and the Courts to affirm 
antitrust liability in cases where inherency theory would have commanded 
a finding of antitrust immunity.  In Magill, the EU courts applied the 
exceptionalism framework and concluded to the existence of an unlawful 
abuse.84  In contrast, the application of inherency concepts like “specific 
subject matter” and “essential function” vindicated by Advocate General 
Gulmann would have led to exonerate the TV channels from antitrust 





In 2004, the EU Commission introduced a novel idea in soft law 
instruments: that antitrust and IPR policies share complementary goals.86  
Without more qualifications, this idea means that competition law can 
apply with full force to IPR conduct.  Pushed to the extreme, virtually any 
ex post antitrust intervention into IPR strategies is legitimate.   
In this section, we expose (A) the source of the theory of 
complementarity, and proceed to evaluate if it is borne out by the case-law 
of the CJEU (B). 
 
A.  Exposition 
 
In 2004, a new theory of complementarity was introduced in a soft law 
instrument of the EU Commission entitled “Guidelines on Technology 
                                                                                                       
practices and from condoning welfare-reducing ones.” 
84
 In 2008, four years after the judgment, the IMS Health case had not been decided by 
the National Court. See Rodger, B. (2008) Article 234 and Competition Law: An Analysis, 
Kluwer Law International, at p.376.  
85
 We thus share the reading of Professor Drexl who notes that IMS Health, the Court 
“is prepared to apply Article 82 EC with the effect of controlling the use of a given right 
within its scope of exclusivity”. See Drexl, J. Is there a more economic approach to 
intellectual property and competition law, in Drexl, J (Ed.), (2010), Research handbook on 
Intellectual property and Competition law. Edward Elgar Publishing, at p.37. See 
Czapracka (2009), p.98 who observes that under this case-law, “competition concerns are 
given priority over the need to maintain effective protection of IP rights”. Yet Czapracka 
also notes that before Magill and IMS Health, “The specific subject matter and 
existence/exercise theories have never been much of a safe harbor for IP owners”.   
86
 Czapracka (2009) id. at p.37 stresses that this idea can be traced back to the works of 
Bowman, W. (1973). Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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Transfer Agreements”.87  Pursuant to this theory, which has been 
reproduced verbatim in the latest update of the Guidelines in 2014:  
“[B]oth bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting 
consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation 
constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and 
competitive market economy. Intellectual property rights promote dynamic 
competition by encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or 
improved products and processes. So does competition by putting pressure 
on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights 
and competition are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a 
competitive exploitation thereof”.88  
The introduction of this new theory seems to pair with an implicit 
rejection of the theory of exceptionalism.  The Guidelines nowhere refer 
to “exceptional circumstances”. Neither do they mention the protective 
inherency concepts adumbrated in prior case-law.89     
Drexl offers the following reading of the 2004 Guidelines: in his view 
they “refe[r] to a concept of complementarity of the two fields of 
intellectual property law and competition law”.90   
At the operational level, the Guidelines’ theory of complementarity 
entails that IPR agreements must be scrutinized pursuant to Article 101 
TFEU under a “balancing” approach.91  The idea is to weigh the private 
interest of safeguarding IPR owners’ freedom against the public interest of 
protecting undistorted competition.   
Moreover, the Commission’s interpretation of the public interest is not 
limited to undistorted competition, but seems instead to be open-ended 
one.  In relation to non-challenge clauses, the Commission suggests that 
eradicating weak IPRs belongs to the public interest protected by the 
competition rules: “The public interest of strengthening the incentive of the 
licensor to license out by not being forced to continue dealing with a 
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 Drexl and Anderman nonetheless follow this approach.   
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 2004 Commission Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty to technology transfer agreement, 2004/C 101/02, §7; See also, §7 of the 2014 
Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
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Guidelines, 2014/C 89/03, supra note 88, §9. 
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 See Drexl (2008) op. cit. supra note 85, at p.53.  
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 See Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case 418/01, IMS Health, ECLI:EU:C:2003:537, 
which describes the balancing test at §62: “weighing the balance between the interest in 
protection of the intellectual property right and the economic freedom of its owner, on the 
one hand, and the interest in protection of free competition”. 
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licensee that challenges the very subject matter of the licence agreement 
has to be balanced against the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to 
economic activity which may arise where an intellectual property right was 
granted in error”.92 
With all this, it is obvious that the theory of complementarity is less 
deferent to the interests of IPR owners than the theory of exceptionalism 
that prevails under Article 102 TFEU. Drexl, who seems wary of 
excessive IPR protection advocates that “The Commission would be well 
advised to extend its concept of complementary goals of IP law and 
competition law from the field of technology transfer agreements to the area 
of abuse of dominance (Article 82 EC) and merger control”.93 
 
B.  Evaluation 
 
The theory of complementarity has made forays into the Court’s 
contemporary case-law.94 Scarlett Extended – a non-antitrust case 
occasionally mentioned in EU Commission decisions as supportive 
authority for its enforcement initiatives –95suggests that a degree of 
balancing is appropriate between the private interest of IP owners and the 
freedom of third parties to conduct their own business: “The protection of 
the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 
There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or 
in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for 
that reason be absolutely protected”.96   
Even more clearly, the Court of justice has seemed to endorse the 
theory of complementarity in its 2015 judgment in Huaweï v ZTE, holding 
that the “Court must strike a balance between maintaining free competition 
– in respect of which primary law and, in particular, Article 102 TFEU – 
and the requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual-property 
rights and its right to effective judicial protection guaranteed by Article 
17(2) and Article 47 of the Charter”.97 
Besides those judicial pronouncements, the theory of complementarity 
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seems particularly popular with antitrust enforcers. On the conference 
circuit, agency officials in charge of selling antitrust policy routinely use it 
to appease critiques of antitrust dogmatism.98  
If anything, this emerging case-law suggests that Commission’s soft 
law instruments can progressively be given legal force through judicial 
endorsement.  However, the nature of the complementarity relationship 
that governs the antitrust and IP intersection is left entirely open by the 
Court of Justice.  The CJEU case-law does not specify the weight to be 
respectively ascribed to the antitrust and IPR variables in the balancing 
equation.  Therefore, the theory of complementarity says nothing more 
than that antitrust law can apply to IP rights.  
More generally, we would like to stress that in a relationship of 
complementarity, components can and do generally occupy distinct 
hierarchical positions.  To take a graphic analogy, ethologists often 
explain that complementary species in a same ecosystem occupy high and 
low places in the food chain, the lion and the antelope being a perfect 
example.  With this background, in Huaweï v ZTE, the Court has ordered 
the competition and IP variables in a way that suggests that property and 
judicial rights may occupy a higher position than antitrust protection.  The 
operative part of the judgment, which sets out a safe harbour to patent 
owners willing to avoid antitrust liability, clearly confirms this reading.99  
Last, we note that the theory of complementarity has not been 
introduced in the legislative instrument that the Guidelines purport to 
accompany, namely the Block Exemption Regulation on technology 
transfer agreements.100  This silence may be interpreted as a sign of the 
lawmakers’ discomfort with the theory of complementarity.   
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 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of 
Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of 
technology transfer agreements, OJ L 93, 28.3.2014, p. 17–23. 
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IV. REJECTED THEORIES 
In a 2010 paper on compulsory licensing, Temple Lang noted that “the 
law has developed piecemeal without any explicit framework or general 
principle”.101  His paper, which ambitioned to cure this defect, advanced 
the proposition that IPR conduct should never be deemed unlawful in 
itself, unless it is accompanied by an “additional abusive conduct”.  
We reproduce hereafter his own words: “[i]t cannot be illegal for even 
a dominant company to use intellectual property rights as they are 
designed to be used”.  Instead, “[t]he Court has said that an additional 
rule applies in the case of intellectual property rights. When a licence of 
an intellectual property right is asked for, the refusal to licence is unlawful 
only if there is some other “additional abusive conduct”, as well as the 
refusal to licence”.102   
Of course, the outstanding issue is to understand “what kind of 
“additional abuse” is required, or how it must be linked to the refusal to 
contract”.103  Temple Lang advances the hypothesis that a refusal to 
license except on excessive royalty terms could constitute “additional 
abusive conduct” arousing Article 102 TFEU liability. 
According to Temple Lang, the source of the “additional abusive 
conduct” requirement is the Court judgment in AB Volvo and Erik Veng.   
On careful consideration, this reading of the case-law seems, however, 
doubtful.  In AB Volvo and Erik Veng, the Court simply held that the 
exercise of an exclusive right may be caught by Article 102 TFEU if 
“certain abusive conduct” is present.  In our view, the element of 
“additional” abuse thus constitutes a misleading extrapolation.  Nowhere 
does it appear in the judgment.    
Another possible critique is that the Court’s ruling seems to say 
something slightly different than what Temple Lang argues in his paper.  
In essence, the Court notes that the exclusive prerogatives attached to 
IPRs can blossom into several types of anticompetitive abuses (eg, outright 
refusal to license, excessive licensing conditions, etc.).  In the Court’s 
view, IPR conduct and antitrust abuse are one and a same thing, and there 
is no need for additional conduct to trigger the prohibition rule of Article 
102 TFEU. 
 
V.  THE RULE-BASED APPROACH  
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We now approach the main finding of our paper.  In our view, the 
most noteworthy feature of the CJEU case-law on the antitrust-IP 
intersection is methodological, not substantive.  In almost all cases, the 
CJEU promotes a rule-based approach, instead of a standards-based 
approach (A).104 Given, however, that this case-law has essentially 
developed under Article 102 TFEU, an open question is whether a rule 
based approach also prevails under Article 101 TFEU.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that the CJEU’s pronouncements in that field are rarer, there is 
credence to the argument that Article 101 TFEU cases are also scrutinized 
under a rule-based approach (B).  In our opinion, the CJEU’s systemic 
commitment to a rule-based approach in such cases denotes a plausible 
concern that discretionary antitrust intervention against IPRs on the basis 
of post hoc standards would send adverse signals to IPR owners, and 
disincentivize the production of socially beneficial innovation (C).   
 




Crane defines rules as “specifications of liability criteria in formal, 
seemingly precise, and usually short directives”.105  And Posner writes that 
a rule “singles out one or a few facts and makes it r them legally 
determinative”.106  In essence, a rule-based approach entails the ex ante 
setting of structured tests of liability.  A plain example is a legal command 
declaring that it is unlawful to “driv[e] in excess of 55 miles per hour on 
expressways”.107   
By contrast, a standard-based approach consists in a flexible resolution 
of each case on grounds of “open ended, multi-factor and post hoc” 
considerations such as reasonableness, consumer welfare, competition on 
the merits, efficiency, fairness, equity, etc.108 A plain example is a statute 
that bans “driving at an excessive speed on expressways”.109 
Rules can be found piecemeal across various areas of EU competition 
law.  The justifiability segment found in Article 101 paragraph 3 TFEU is 
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a good illustration of a rule-based system.  A four-pronged test must be 
met to trigger the benefit of an exemption.110 In Article 102 TFEU, 
predatory pricing is subject to a rule-based approach.  The AKZO case-law 
holds that prices below average variable costs are presumptively abusive, 
while prices above average total costs are presumptively lawful.111  
Finally, rules can also be encountered in merger law.  The Airtours 
judgment requires the fulfillment of three cumulative conditions for the 




In this section, we show that the Court has conventionally followed a 
rule-based approach in the various categories of cases submitted to its 
scrutiny. 
 
a. Refusal to license IPRs 
Refusal to license cases clearly carry the point, though with a 
somewhat convoluted history.  In AB Volvo and Erik Veng, the Court 
initially embraced a standard-based approach which left entirely open the 
conditions under which it could be deemed abusive for an IPR holder to 
refuse to license its technology.  This judicial policy was abandoned in 
Magill, when the Court promulgated the “exceptional circumstances” rule 
whereby a refusal to license is abusive if it prevents “the appearance of a 
new product”; without justification; and this “reserves for [the dominant 
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 See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01, Article 101(3): “The provisions of 
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firm] the secondary market and exclu[des] all competition on that 
market”.113   
Magill was not, however, the end of the story.  In IMS Health, the 
next compulsory licensing case to reach the CJEU, a “serious dispute” 
occurred on whether the satisfaction of either of the Magill circumstances 
was sufficient to affirm liability pursuant to Article 102 TFEU.114  The 
IMS Health Court resolved the issue, holding all three conditions to be 
cumulative, and not alternative.115  
Interestingly, the rule-based approach in compulsory licensing cases 
was not instantly sustained by the General Court.  In Microsoft, the GC 
used a standard-based approach to review the Commission decision that 
had declared the dominant OS maker guilty of unlawful refusal to supply 
interoperability information.  The judgment found that Microsoft’s 
conduct ran counter to the abstract wording of Article 102 b) TFEU which 
talks of a “limitation [of] technical development”.116  As was previously 
argued, the Commission’s decision did not meet the requirements of the 
Magill/IMS Health rule, and especially the “new product” and elimination 
of “all competition” conditions.  The General Court held that this did not 
matter, for the Commission had met the “limitation of technical 
development” standard.   
In 2012, the General Court nevertheless operated a spectacular U-turn.  
In Microsoft II – a case about the remedial consequences of the 
Commission’s infringement decision – the General Court no longer talked 
                                         
113
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to the “limitation of technical development” standard.  In an obiter dictum, 
the GC explicitly refers to the “three cumulative conditions” of IMS 
Health as the test applicable to refusals to license IPRs.117  
 
b. IPR remedy cases (1) 
IPR remedy cases have also been dealt with under a rule-based 
approach.  While there is no CJEU case-law on this, the judgment of the 
General Court in Protégé International held that a finding of abuse can 
only occur in “wholly exceptional circumstances”, and this requires the 
showing of two conditions: “the action (i) cannot reasonably be 
considered as an attempt to establish the rights of the undertaking 
concerned and can therefore only serve to harass the opposite party; and 
(ii) it is conceived in the framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate 
competition”.118   Those conditions are cumulative and sequential: the 
second condition is only examined if the first condition is satisfied.119  And 
given the fundamental right of access to court, the two conditions “must 
be construed and applied strictly”.120 
 
c. IPR remedy cases (2) 
The CJEU endorsed again a rule based approach in cases in which 
owners of FRAND-pledged SEPs had sought injunctions against 
unlicensed implementers of their technology.   
In Huaweï v ZTE, the Court held that antitrust liability could be 
affirmed against IPR owners enforcement actions in the presence of two 
particular circumstances.  First, the “patent at issue is essential to a 
standard established by a standardisation body”.121 Second, “the patent at 
issue obtained SEP status only in return for the proprietor’s irrevocable 
undertaking, given to the standardisation body in question, that it is 
prepared to grant licences on FRAND terms”.122  According to the Court, 
such conditions create “legitimate expectations on the part of third 
parties” that holders of FRAND pledged SEPs will openly license their 
technology.123  
Closely related to this is the fact that Huaweï v ZTE also sets a rule of 
exoneration, besides the liability rule.  The Huaweï v ZTE court explains 
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the conditions under which a dominant FRAND-pledged SEP holder that 
applies for an injunction can avoid a finding of abuse.124  First, the patent 
owner must “alert the alleged infringer of the infringement complained 
about by designating that SEP and specifying the way in which it has been 
infringed”.125  Second, the patent owner must “present to that alleged 
infringer a specific, written offer for a licence on FRAND terms, in 
accordance with the undertaking given to the standardisation body, 
specifying, in particular, the amount of the royalty and the way in which 
that royalty is to be calculated”.126   Third, at each stage, the patent owner 
must leave to the implementing infringer a sufficient time to react – 
declaration of willingness to transact, acquiescence or counter-offer – 
prior to contemplating the seeking of a court injunction. If the patent 
owner complies with those procedural “conditions”, he “does not abuse 
its dominant position … by bringing an action for infringement”.127   
 
d. Pricing (and terms) of IPR licenses 
The DSD judgment is also rule-based, though less explicitly.  The 
Grand Chamber of the CJEU upheld the GC and the Commission 
decisions on the ground that they had correctly applied the rule set in the 
case-law on unfair pricing.  As the Court recalls, a firm “abuses its 
dominant position where it charges for its services fees which are 
disproportionate to the economic value of the service provided”, a finding 
that is not left to full agency discretion, but that must be established by 
reference to price-cost metrics.128  On the facts, the CJEU seemed satisfied 
that the Commission had carried out – though in a crude way – the price-
cost rule required for exploitative abuses cases.129  
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B.  Rule-Based Approach in Coordinated Conduct Cases? 
 
If it is true that the CJEU follows a rule-based approach in antitrust 
cases with IP ramifications, then one should expect to observe it also in 
the Article 101 TFEU case-law.  Unfortunately, however, no such 
showing can be made. For the reasons previously explained, the CJEU has 
produced little case-law on the intersection between Article 101 TFEU and 
IPRs. Until new cases are brought to the Court, this question will remain 
unresolved.   
This notwithstanding, the submission of this paper is that the CJEU 
needs not (or less) introduce judge-made “rules” in its Article 101 TFEU 
case-law for the simple reason that such rules are already hard wired in 
the wording of Article 101 TFEU.  Unlike Article 102 TFEU, the letter of 
Article 101 TFEU imposes a very structured process and several 
substantive conditions before a finding of liability can be attained.  The 
first paragraph of Article 101 TFEU imposes the characterization of an 
“agreement”, and a showing of anticompetitive impact by “object” or 
“effect”.  The demonstration of anticompetitive effect, in turn requires 
proof of an adverse, plausible and appreciable impact on competition.  If 
all those conditions are met, the third paragraph of Article 101 TFEU then 
gives defendants an opportunity to rebut antitrust liability if they bring 
proof of four cumulative conditions, namely that their agreement (i) 
“promo[tes] the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress”; (ii) “allow[s] consumers a fair share of 
the resulting benefit”; (iii) does not impose “restrictions which are not 
indispensable”; and does not lead to the “possibility of eliminating 
competition”. 
By design, Article 101 TFEU cases thus enshrine a rule-based 
approach.   
In addition to this, the scant case-law on the antitrust-IP intersection 
under Article 101 TFEU whispers adherence to the rule-based framework.  
To start, let us look at one contemporary case where the CJEU was 
invited to move away from the rule-based framework of the Treaty, and 
embrace a standard-based approach.  In GSK v Commission, the 
pharmaceutical company GSK had been found guilty of a restriction of 
competition by object on the ground that it had applied a system of dual 
pricing which penalized Spanish buyers who engaged in parallel exports.  
On appeal, the General Court considered that the existence of a restriction 
by object had to be characterized by recourse to a standard, namely 
23-Jun-16]  EUROPEAN ANTITRUST-IP INTERSECTION 32 
consumer harm.130   
On further appeal, the CJEU vacated the GC judgment. It noted that 
“neither the wording of Article [101(1) TFEU nor the case-law lend 
support to such a position”, and that the GC had committed an error of 
law by “requiring proof that the agreement entails disadvantages for final 
consumers as a prerequisite for a finding of anti-competitive object”.131  
What seemed to drive the Court’s analyzis is the imperative of sticking to 
the clear text of the Treaty: “there is nothing in that provision to indicate 
that only those agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages 
may have an anti-competitive object (emphasis added)”.132 
In all events, many older judgments of the Court at the antitrust-IP 
intersection suggest a commitment to a rule-based approach in Article 101 
TFEU cases.  This is true of the case-law on territorial restrictions in 
licensing agreements, where the Court has affirmed a per se prohibition 
rule.  The scope of this per se rule is often confusingly presented as a 
blanket and prohibition of all licensing restrictions which limit “parallel 
trade” in the EU.  This reading is wrong.  The Court’s judgments set out 
a structured liability test which only apprehends a subset of licensing 
restrictions that exhibit certain features.  Those conditions are the 
following: (1) the licensing restrictions must compartmentalize national 
markets, by opposition to licensing restrictions that insulate regional or 
local markets;133 (2) the licensing restrictions must provide “absolute” 
protection to the licensee on a national territory, and not any kind of 
protection from competitive imports. 
 Let us sift through the main cases.  The per se prohibition rule was 
affirmed in Consten and Grundig v Commission.  As previously explained, 
Grundig, a manufacturer of radio receivers, recorders, dictaphones and 
television sets, had granted exclusive territorial protection to Consten for 
the distribution of its products in France.  Under the contract, Consten 
would be prohibited to actively and passively export machines outside the 
contract area, and Grundig had imposed a similar prohibition on its sole 
distributors in other countries and on its German wholesalers.  Moreover, 
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Grundig would not sell machines to other distributors in France.  On 
appeal, the CJEU confirmed the existence of an infringement, noting that 
the arrangement gave rise to “absolute territorial protection” and resulted 
in the “isolation of the French market”.   
Since then, Consten and Grundig has been repeated on many 
occasions, and in relation to a variety of IPRs.  To take a few examples, 
in Nungesser and Eisele, the French National Institute for Agricultural 
Research (“INRA”) had licensed breeders rights over maize seeds to a 
supplier of seeds in Germany.  The licensing agreement provided that 
INRA would refrain from issuing other licenses in Germany and from 
supplying seeds itself in Germany.  Moreover, there was a contractual 
commitment by INRA and the licensee to use all possible means to ensure 
that third parties would not import from other Member States into 
Germany, and from Germany towards other Member States.  When 
parallel importers introduced INRA seeds for sale to German buyers, 
INRA sought to exert pressures and commenced legal proceedings.  The 
dispute was finally resolved by the Court, which held that: “absolute 
territorial protection granted to a licensee in order to enable parallel 
imports to be controlled and prevented results in the artificial maintenance 
of separate national markets, contrary to the Treaty”.134   
Last, in Football Association Premier League Ltd. (FAPL), the Court 
was questioned on the legality of the exclusive licensing agreements 
between FAPL and a number of national broadcasters over Europe.  
Those agreements included a general obligation on each national 
broadcaster to ensure that broadcasts could not be “received outside that 
territory” and of a specific “prohibition from supplying decoding devices 
that allow their broadcasts to be decrypted … outside the 
territory”.135  Though not strictly about copyright, the case shocked the 
European broadcasting industry because the Court affirmed in that: “an 
agreement which might tend to restore the divisions between national 
markets is liable to frustrate the Treaty’s objective of achieving the 
integration of those markets” and “must be regarded, in principle, as 
agreements whose object is to restrict competition (emphasis added)”. 
Clearly, the wording of those judgments bespeaks a per se prohibition 
rule against licensing restrictions which create “export bans”, “partition 
national markets”, and give ultimately rise to “absolute territorial 
protection”.  The Court’s case-law, by contrast, does not endorse a loose, 
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 CJEU, C-258/78, Nungesser v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1982:211, §61. 
135
 CJEU, C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd. (FAPL), 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:631, §35. 
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abstract and general standard like the limitation, distortion or restriction 
of parallel trade.  
To close, we observe that a rule based approach seems also to prevail 
in relation to arguments made by defendants willing to redeem 
anticompetitive licensing restrictions.  Ottung and Bayer AG v Sullhofer 
provide two possible illustrations.  Whilst the Court admitted that some 
licensing clauses could be dealt with under a standards approach (the 
Court pointed out to an analyzis of the “economic and legal context”), 
both judgments are essentially known for the rule of immunity, and the 
accompanying structured test, set out in relation to certain anticompetitive 
licensing restrictions.  In Ottung, the Court considered that an obligation 
to pay royalty for an indeterminate period that possibly extends beyond 
patent expiry was per se lawful, as long as the licensee kept the ability to 
terminate the licensing agreement by giving reasonable notice.136  This rule 
of legality was recently recalled by Advocate General Wathelet in his 
Opinion in Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmBH.137  In Bayer AG v Sullhofer, 
the Court ruled that non challenge clauses fall short of Article 101(1) 
TFEU when the agreement provides for a free license or relates to an 
outdated process that the licensee did not use.138   
Even more clearly, the judgment in Erauw Jacquery v La Hesbignonne 
conveys a rule based approach.139 Here, the CJEU held that liability for 
absolute territorial protection can be eschewed if this is needed to protect 
(i) a supplier who has incurred “considerable financial commitment”; (ii) 
                                         
136 CJEU, 382/87, Kai Ottung v Klee & Weilbach A/S and Thomas Schmidt A/S, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:195, §13. 
137 Opinion of AG Wathelet in C‑567/14, Genentech Inc. v Hoechst GmBH, not yet 
published (proposing immunity for royalty demands bearing on patents which were 
subsequently revoked or deemed non infringed). 
138 CJEU, 65/86, Bayer AG and Maschinenfabrik Hennecke GmbH v Heinz Süllhöfer, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:448, at §§17 and 18.  
139
 CJEU, 27/87, SPRL Louis Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne SC., 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:183, §10.  In the past, there was another exception for absolute territorial 
protection that exonerated agreements devoid of appreciable effects on competition (also 
known as de minimis agreements).  See CJEU, 5/69, Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. 
Vervaecke, ECLI:EU:C:1969:35, §§5-7: “An exclusive dealing agreement, even with 
absolute territorial protection, may, having regard to the weak position of the persons 
concerned on the market in the products in question in the area covered by the absolute 
protection, escape the prohibition laid down in article 85(1 ).”  However, in Expedia, the 
CJEU eliminated this exception.  It held that “It must therefore be held that an agreement 
that may affect trade between Member States and that has an anti-competitive object 
constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an 
appreciable restriction on competition”.  See CJEU, C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v Autorité de 
la concurrence, ECLI:EU:C:2012:79, §37. 
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against risks of “improper handling” of his input.140   
 
C.  Rationale for a Rule-Based Approach in Antitrust Cases involving 
IPRs? 
 
All readers of EU case-law are familiar with the CJEU longstanding 
practice of stating what the law is, without articulating why this law is 
justified.141  In the IP field, Korah once talked about the Court’s “frequent 
unwillingness to analyze theoretically, but rather to rule on results”.142  In 
this section, we therefore attempt to uncover the intellectual foundations of 
the rule-based approach.   
At an abstract level, there are several explanatory factors for a rule-
based approach in antitrust cases with IPR ramifications.  Given the perils 
of ex post rationalization, we decline to choose amongst them.  
First, a well-known advantage of structured tests of liability, as 
opposed to loose standards is their predictability.143  In contrast, standards 
leave more space for discretionary intervention.   
With this background, it is conceivable that the Court adheres to the 
idea that legal uncertainty disincentivizes investments, and that this risk is 
even more compounded in areas with high IPR density where the strength 
of intellectual property exert – an indeterminate yet certain – influence on 
investments into innovation.  We join in this respect Regibeau and Rockett 
who suggest that the adoption of clear rules acts as a remedy against 
regulatory opportunism into IPRs.144   
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 Competition academics tend, however, to relativize the relevance of the ruling.  
According to Professor Korah and O’Sullivan the judgment delineates a “very narrow 
exception” due to the specific nature of plant breeders’ rights. Talking of a “very narrow 
exception”, due to the specific nature of plant breeders’ rights. Korah, V. & O’Sullivan, D., 
(2002) Distribution Agreements under the EC Competition Rules, Hart Publishing, at p.82. 
Ezrachi goes even further.  He talks of the “unique circumstances” of the case. See Ezrachi, 
A., (2014) EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases, Bloomsbury, 
at p.337. 
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 Something that can be described as “it-is-so-because-we-say-so” jurisprudence, see 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 552 (1989) (Justice Scalia, 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
142 Korah, V. (2001), supra note 48, at p.818. 
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 As Crane notes: “One strong advantage of rules over standards is predictability, which 
matters most when one is trying to incentivize appropriate behavior”. See Crane, D. (2007) 
supra note 105, at p.85. 
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 Regibeau, P. & Rockett, K. (2007) The relationship between intellectual property 
law and competition law”, in Andermans (2007), supra note 8: “A further reason not to 
allow competition law judges to systematically revisit the trade-offs already considered by 
(intellectual) property law is what economists refer to as the risk of regulatory 
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Second, the rule-based approach may be a signalling device, used to 
reassure the Member States that the EU will not discretionarily encroach 
upon their exclusive competence in relation to property rights.  As 
Dreyfus and Liannos argue, the antitrust-IP intersection is shaped “by the 
division of competence between the EU and its Member States with regard 
to IP and competition law”.145 
Third, judicial economy considerations may also have exerted 
influence on the Court’s case law.  Given the frequency of IPR 
transactions, the additional cost of designing a rule (which is borne only 
once) is likely to be lower than the costs of applying a standard on a case 
by case basis.146  The same is true for users of the law (be they 
competition agencies, national courts, and practitioners) who incur only 
once the cost of figuring out what the law is, and can then spread this 
fixed cost over an indefinite number of cases.147 
Last, the rule-based approach may again be rationalized on the basis of 
the well-known aversion of the CJEU vis-à-vis the use of economics in the 
                                                                                                       
opportunism. As we saw in part I, once intellectual property is produced (and disclosed), 
the socially optimal allocation is for every economic agent to have free access to it. In 
other words, the optimal level of monopoly power ex post is none. As competition law only 
faces such ex post situations, there might be a strong temptation to limit the use of IP-
based monopoly power so much that adequate rewards for investment in IP could no 
longer be provided. This temptation might even be stronger at the level of individual cases 
since, as we discussed above, a single case is unlikely to significantly the expected reward 
on which investors base their decisions. However, succumbing to this temptation would 
lead to a ‘death of a thousand cuts’, where the combined effect of apparently innocuous 
individual case decisions combine to wreck the delicate balance achieved by IP law. The 
remedy against regulatory opportunism is commitment. In the case of competition law, 
commitment can only come from the clarity of how the law should be implemented. The 
clearer the rules, the stronger the commitment. It would therefore be advisable to explicitly 
state that competition law should respect the rights granted by (intellectual) property law 
and that the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is not a primary concern of 
competition law. This principle does not prevent the enforcement of (possibly strict) 
competition laws but it implies that conditions under which the use of monopoly power will 
be restricted must be as unambiguous as possible. The essential facility doctrine can be 
seen as a good example of such an approach. On the one hand, it is entirely consistent with 
the general respect of property rights that we advocate and acknowledges that property 
rights can only be effective if they do imply some monopoly power. On the other hand, it 
allows for a clear exception when the monopoly power associated with the property right is 
so large as to result in an unacceptable loss of welfare”. 
145
 See Lianos and Dreyfuss (2013) supra note 4, at p.53. 
146
 See Kaplow, L. (1992), supra note 14, at p.621: “The central factor influencing the 
desirability of rules an standards is the frequency with which a law will govern conduct If 
conduct will be frequent, the additional costs of designing rules-which are borne once-are 
likely to be exceeded by the savings realized each time the rule is applied”. 
147 Id. p.583. 
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adjudication of cases.  As Crane notes, “rules signal a greater importance 
for lawyers and standards signal a greater role for economists in antitrust 
adjudication”.148 And while the Court’s distaste of economics in genuine 
antitrust cases is well-known, its discomfort with the economics of IP 
seems at least equal.  We certainly have no direct proof of this, but some 
indirect pronouncements provide some evidence.  In its case-law, the 
Court has made many conflicting pronouncements on the relationship 
between ownership of IPRs and market power.  Whilst in Magill, the 
Court asserted that “[s]o far as dominant position is concerned, it is to be 
remembered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property 
right cannot confer such a position”, it contradicted itself in Sot Lelos kai 
Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline with the formidable – and flawed – 
statement that: “a medicine is protected by a patent which confers a 
temporary monopoly on its holder”.149 If anything, the spectacular degree 
of confusion of the Court on this basic issue strongly suggests a 




This article has provided a survey of the case-law and of the 
scholarship on the antitrust-IP intersection.  Its main conclusion is that no 
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 Other courts have also made baffling statements over the market power that 
allegedly stems from IP. See GC, T-321/05, AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc v 
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meaning of the second sentence of Article 36”. 
23-Jun-16]  EUROPEAN ANTITRUST-IP INTERSECTION 38 
substantive theory drives the relationship between ex ante IPR policy and 
ex post competition enforcement.  Instead, the singularity of the case-law 
in this field is that the CJEU predominantly approaches antitrust cases 
with IPR ramifications under a rule-based approach.   
This methodological choice certainly has many merits.  But it begets a 
fundamental question: that of the optimal design (content) of the legal 
rules applicable at the antitrust-IP intersection.   
Moreover, when looked at more closely, the rules defined by the 
CJEU often seem to embed standards.  Put differently, the case-law at the 
antitrust-IP intersection formulates structured tests of liability or 
justifiability that resort to abstract concepts.   For instance, the DSD 
judgment talks of fees which are “disproportionate” to the economic value 
of the service.  Similarly, the four prong test of Article 101(3) talks of 
“improving”, “fair”, “indispensable” or “substantial”. Those notions are 
closer to the excessive speed standard than from the 55 miles per hour 
rule.   
With this qualification, our conclusion ought to be that the Court 
approaches the antitrust-IP intersection with a rule-based spirit, but when 
it comes to give content to structured test of liability and justifiability, it 
resorts to abstract concepts.  The implications of this judicial policy are 
not entirely clear.  Does this correct the traditional risks of over and 
under-inclusion (or both) encountered with rules-based approach?151 If this 
is the case, does this come at the expense of legal certainty? 
Future research in this field is needed.  As often in antitrust law, the 
input of economics will surely be of great assistance. 
 
 
* * * 
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